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BACKGROUND
After President Donald Trump’s memorandum on August 14, 2017 stating that
China’s behavior regarding intellectual property rights (IPR) and the high technology
industries adversely influences the U.S. economy, the USTR declared the initiation of
a section 301 investigation of China on the topic of technology transfer and
intellectual property rights (The White House, 2017; USTR, 2017). Before this event,
the USTR had not used the section 301 investigation of China for nearly 10 years
(USTR, 2017). This research project will analyze potential outcomes of this
investigation, based on the experiences that are gained from analyzing past Section
301 investigations.
History and Development of Section 301
Section 301 is a part of the Trade Act of 1974, which endowed the USTR (2017)
with the capability to deal with the unfair trade relationships with other countries. If
the USTR realized, or was told by an industry association or company, that a foreign
country was engaging in unfair activities (for example, setting trade barriers to
American companies, violating their rights, or dumping), he would use his discretion
or obey the direction of the president to take appropriate actions. Section 301
investigations are usually actions taken by the USTR; however, the USTR will not
take actions when “the rights of the United States under a trade agreement are not
being denied” (Trade Act of 1974, 2016, p.191), the rights of the United States are not
violated, the foreign country agreed to correct its unfair trade practices, or the action
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that was taken may have the chance to impact the economy and security of the U.S.
After implementing the investigation, the USTR is able to apply four methods to
respond to the foreign countries. First, the USTR can suspend or deprive the benefits
listed in the trade agreement that had been established at an earlier time. Second,
imposing tariffs and setting trade barriers on the foreign country’s imported goods
and services into the U.S. can be considered. Third, the USTR can also set limits on
or postpone treatments, such as the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. The
fourth method is that, the foreign countries that sign binding agreements with the U.S.
can agree to lift the existing trade restrictions, terminate the actions that harm the
U.S., or offer compensation. Although the section 301 is a policy in regards to
imports and exports, the action that the U.S. chooses to take may not be directly
related to trade itself (Trade Act of 1974, 2016).
In 1984, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 amended the Trade Act of 1974, which
elucidated the conditions and situations of implementing section 301 (Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, 1984). Four years later, the Omnibus Foreign Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 further modified the section 301 clause. Super 301 and
special 301 appeared as the amendments of general section 301 for the first time in
the 1988 version (USTR, 1988; Moyer, 1994).
The special 301 targets only the intellectual property rights (IPR) that foreign
countries may not appropriately protect. The USTR will complete a National Trade
Estimate (NTE), which he will send to the United States Congress before taking
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actions. The foreign countries that are evaluated by the NTE as inadequately
protecting IPR or “denying fair and equitable market access to United States persons
that rely upon intellectual property protection” (U.S. Code, 2012, p.511) will be
registered as “priority foreign countries”. At one point, China and India were on the
list (National Trade Evaluated, 2017).
Before identifying priority foreign countries, the USTR should contact the proper
departments or offices regarding IPR and consider all the necessary information to
ensure that these foreign countries are truly not protecting the IPR. The USTR also
needs to consider the history of IPR development in the foreign countries and take
into account their improvement after inspection by the U.S. (Trade Act of 1974,
2016).
The super 301 focuses on certain foreign countries that have exceptionally unfair
trade practices. Within 180 days after finishing the NTE, the USTR ought to
determine the priority foreign countries and submit the list to Congress. The USTR
should name the primary restrictions of the foreign country, judge whether the foreign
country complies with the trade agreements, and consider the impact of the
procurement plans and international position of the foreign government (USTR,
1988).
The section 301 is significantly more integrated and comprehensive, as it
developed from just one clause to ten clauses later. Initially, the subjects of
investigations were only goods, but were extended to services and the area of direct
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investment in subsequent years. The scope of jurisdiction also grew, starting with
only the economy and trade area, expanding to the political arena to include issues
such as labor rights. After the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the U.S. expanded the range of application of section 301 to nearly every field,
including tariffs (Gero and Lanna, 1995).
Initiation of Section 301, Super 301, and Special 301
Section 301
According to the section 302 of the Trade Act of 1974, the section 301
investigation will be applied in the following steps. First of all, any person or group
that is interested can appeal to the USTR to take actions under section 301. Within the
45 days after receiving the petition, the USTR needs to decide whether or not he is
going to initiate the investigation. If the USTR resolves to not implement an
investigation, it will publish an announcement to clarify the reasons for not doing so
in the Federal Register, as well as notifying the petitioners. If the USTR decides to
initiate an investigation, it needs to publish a summary of the petition while holding
public hearings (Trade Act of 1974, 2016).
After making the decision, the USTR should have a process of consultation. In
general, the USTR needs to decide whether the foreign country violates the rights of
the U.S. within 12 months of the process’ initiation (Trade Act of 1974, 2016). If the
investigation is related to compensation and anti-dumping, the USTR is required to
make a decision within 18 months. Investigations related to the intellectual property
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rights need to be determined within six months. The determination requires being
published in the Federal Register. The USTR should take action within a certain
period of time, delaying by 180 days under the exception. The USTR will supervise
the implementation situations of foreign countries; he will choose to not take further
actions, if he considers that foreign countries are closely abiding by the agreements.
Under the executive order by the president, or under special circumstances, the USTR
may suspend or terminate a section 301 investigation. The USTR should report to
Congress regularly in regards to the progress of investigation (Trade Act of 1974,
2016).
The USTR is required to provide information, including trade agreements
regarding particular goods, services, investments or IPRs, the similar case, and other
information that is needed by U.S. laws (Trade Act of 1974, 2016).
Special 301
The USTR should initiate a special 301 investigation regarding the policies or
actions of the priority country within 30 days of determining them - however, if the
USTR believes that the investigation will harm the U.S. economy, it will choose to
terminate the investigation following a detailed explanation. Generally, for the cases
regarding intellectual property rights, the USTR will make a decision within six to
nine months. Moreover, under the circumstances that the countries under
investigation are making a draft or taking actions to protect the intellectual property
rights, or if the foreign government is endeavoring to remedy the damage to the U.S.,
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the USTR is able to extend this period of determination by three months (USTR,
1988).
Super 301
Super 301 allows the USTR to implement multiple investigations at the same
time, changing the module of section 301 that allows the investigation of only one
policy or behavior, which increases the speed of the crackdown. Within 21 days of
completing the NTE, the USTR should carry out the investigation of the priority
countries. During the negotiations with foreign countries, the USTR typically strives
to come to an agreement that urges foreign countries to eliminate violations or
establish compensation within three years (USTR, 1988).
Since 1974, Japan was investigated by the U.S. 16 times. Aside from the
European Union, it is the most investigated country (Bown and McCulloch, 2009).
What are GATT and WTO?
According to the Brookings Institution’s report (2016), negotiation, illuminations,
and litigation are three primary functions of GATT and WTO. Among the three
functions, negotiation is the most frequently one used by both.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was reached in 1947
is the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which generated the
basics for trading between countries. After the Great Depression and World War II,
there was a darkness in the international trade market; developed countries, such as
Japan and the U.S., set import barriers and imposed high tariffs on other countries. In
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order to get rid of this vicious circle, principal suppliers like the U.S., Canada, and the
United Kingdom negotiated with each other and came up with the GATT, that was
expected to keep the international market stable and eliminate trade restrictions as
much as possible (Brookings, 2016). The GATT was very successful, which
expanded to a party of 128 countries after starting with only 23 members in a short
period of forty-seven years.
The Uruguay Round was the turning point between the GATT and WTO. After
setting up the World Trade Organization, the number of members increased to 150
countries. “Equitable” and “mutually acceptable” are two phrases that are frequently
used by the WTO (Brookings, 2016).
Unlike the GATT, the WTO attracted more developing countries. Most-favorednation (MFN) treatment is the primary reason that developing countries seek to join
the WTO. The MFN is “nondiscrimination by importers across different foreign
export sources” (Brookings, 2016, p.16). If one of the members were to provide a
lower import tax or grant easier access permission to a member, it should also give
that benefit to the other members in the WTO. Preferential trade agreements are also
signed by members (Brookings, 2016).
GATT and WTO do not merely relate to regulating trade behaviors, but also are
crucial components of building mutually beneficial trade relationships among
countries, which are mainly displayed in two aspects. First, countries that are not in
the WTO are inclined to impose higher tariffs during trade. Second, taking the U.S. as
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an example, it will set import restrictions on the dominant goods or services that are
not included by the WTO to protect the domestic market (Brookings, 2016).
The dispute settlement understanding (DSU) is the method that the WTO uses to
solve conflicts (Duke University School of Law, 2017). The dispute settlement body
(DSB) carries out the DSU, by holding panels and meetings, giving advice, reporting,
and so on (WTO, 2017). The DSU is constituted of twenty-seven articles and four
appendixes, which includes the coverage, implementation, general principles, basic
methods and procedures, supervision, process of panels, and so on. Ensuring the
disputes can be resolved in a bilateral way or upon agreements is the vital role of the
DSU, which is a contrast to the unilateral methods - section 301 (WTO, 2017).
The appearance of the WTO did influence the usage of the section 301
investigation. The USTR had initiated section 301 investigations 29 times since the
establishment of WTO in 1995, which accounts for 23.77 percent of all investigations
- there is a collision between the unilateral and bilateral methods (Gero and Lanna,
1995).
The Status Quo of the Trade Relationship between the U.S. and China
The trade relationship between the U.S. and China has changed significantly and
in a positive way since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Since the U.S.
and China established their diplomatic relationship, they gradually evolved to become
each other’s major trade partners (Goodman et al., 2017). The U.S. became China’s
second largest trade partner, second only to the European Union. “China was the
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United States' [third] largest goods export market in 2016” (National Trade Evaluated,
2017, p.77). A great progress has been made by both parties. The total trade volume
expanded to $ 302.1 billion in 2007 from $2.45 billion in 1979. According to the 2017
National Trade Evaluated report (2017), “The U.S. goods trade deficit with China was
$347.0 billion in 2016, a 5.5 percent decrease ($20.1 billion) over 2015. U.S. goods
exports to China were $115.8 billion, down 0.3 percent ($297 million) from the
previous year. Corresponding U.S. imports from China were $462.8 billion, down 4.2
percent” (National Trade Evaluated, 2017, p.77).
As time progressed, China became the second largest world economy, while the
U.S. remained the first. Trade deputation between China and the U.S. became more
and more common - for instance, the U.S. presented additional conditions to China as
their most favored nation. In addition, the difference between China and the U.S.
grew from the traditional trade to new types of industries, such high technology and
intelligent property rights, all step by step (National Trade Evaluated, 2017).
The trade deficit between the U.S. and China grew, as well as the losses caused
by Chinese companies violating IPR protection agreements that negatively influenced
the American markets and labor. On April 18, 2017, President Trump released the
executive order on “Buy American and Hire American”. Halting the inappropriate
behavior of China regarding IPR is an important step for the U.S. to achieve their goal
of “American first” (The White house, 2017).
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In 2017, the U.S. and China put forward the U.S. – China 100-day action plan
under the framework of the U.S. – China Comprehensive Economic Dialogues
(Department of Commerce, 2017). Both sides came to agreements in the four areas of
agriculture, financial services, investment, and energy; however, there is still a long
way to go to attain the “gigantic steps” expected by the public (Bloomberg Politics,
2017; Heatley, 2017). Both the U.S. and China are willing to further discuss the one year plan on trade and economy cooperation and relationship (Bloomberg Politics,
2017).
President Trump finished his Asian tour in November 2017. During President
Trump’s visit in Beijing, the U.S. signed the $ 253.5-billion- deal with China, which
is the largest deal in the U.S. – China trade history. The deals consist of six fields that
are energy, transportation capital expenditures (Capex), agriculture, finance,
technology, and industrial. During the joint meeting with President Xi Jinping,
President Trump gave a speech on the U.S. – China unbalanced trade relationship; he
stated “I don’t blame China. Who can blame a country that is able to take advantage
of another country for the benefit of its citizens? I give China great credit” (Nakamura
and Parker, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/11/08/inbeijing-trump-lavishes-praise-on-chinese-leader-touts-great-chemistry-betweenthem/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e78c46ad4fc0). President Trump changed his
viewpoints to the unfair trade relationship between China and the U.S., which is
criticized by a number of citizens (Philip and Mayeda, 2017; Dollar and Hass, 2017).
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Since the Trade Act of 1974 was published, the USTR had initiated 122 section
301 investigations in total. Besides China, the European Union, Brazil, Japan,
Thailand, and South Korea are key countries investigated by the U.S. on the issues of
intellectual property rights; China was investigated five times successively (Coffield,
1981).
According to the 2017 NTE, the U.S. first acknowledged the improvement and
development of China’s intellectual property rights protection. China follows the
requirements of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), amending “its framework of laws and
regulations aimed at protecting the IPR of domestic and foreign rights holders” (NTE,
2017, p.77). However, China’s market is still on the list of notorious markets of the
2016 special 301 report made by the USTR (USTR, 2016). The NTE (2017) shows
five aspects around which China needs to improve their IPR protection. The first issue
surrounds trade secrets; Chinese companies steal the trade secrets of domestic and
foreign companies in order to give themselves an advantage. The U.S. strongly
advised that China should improve and expand the range of its Anti-Unfair
Competition Laws. After the U.S. – China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT) meeting held in November 2016, China agreed to enhance its protection on
trade secrets. Secondly, the U.S. blamed the bad reputation of China’s trademark
registration. The third aspect is related to the patent and technology transfer regarding
pharmaceuticals. After this, the U.S. pointed to China’s lack of protection against
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online piracy of motion pictures, music, books, software, and video games. The U.S.
exhorted China to establish a healthy surrounding for the development of licensed and
legitimate content. The last aspect is regarding counterfeit goods; the many fake
products manufactured by China result in losses in the U.S. market every year (NTE,
2017).
Hearing of October 10, 2017
The USTR held a public hearing on “section 301 investigation: China’s Acts,
Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation” in the main hearing room of the U.S. International Trade Commission
(CSIS, 2017; Federal Register, 2017). The hearing is a part of the section 301
investigation. Chen Zhou of the China Chamber of International Commerce stated
that the tension caused by the investigation may end up resulting in the trade war
between the two biggest economies (Philip and Mayeda, 2017). Scott Kennedy (2017)
argued that because of the influence of China and the size of China’s market, China’s
attitude towards the intellectual property rights protection may influence the
development of the high technology industry (CSIS, 2017).
Cause Reaction
The investigation created a widespread reaction in both the U.S. and China. The
spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the spokesman of the
Ministry of Commence of China responded to the presidential memorandum and
investigation, stating that “given the increasingly converging China-U.S. interests and
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the close-knit pattern of the two countries being mutually dependent, there will be no
future or winner but only losers in a trade war” (MOF’s regular press conference,
2017, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1484636.shtml).
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The USTR announced that a section 301 investigation would be launched with
China, aimed at the issue of technology transfer and intellectual property rights.
Before that, the U.S. had implemented five section 301 investigations of China.
The first investigation happened on January 4th, 1991. The USTR launched the
special 301 investigation (Bello & Holmer, 1989) in the area of intellectual property
rights, which focused on defects in the Chinese patent law and the failure to protect
the copyright, the trade secret, and the trademark right. Finally, China signed the
intellectual property rights agreement with the U.S. in January 1991, and signed the
China-US memorandum of understanding regarding intellectual property rights
protection on the January 17th, 1992 (Zhang, 1995). China agreed to follow the related
international agreement, and amended domestic associated laws and policies (Stewart,
2004). By the agreement, China changed the patent law, trademark law and issued the
anti-unfair competition law in the latter half of 1992 (Zhang, 1995).
The USTR initiated the second investigation of China on January 10th, 1991
regarding Chinese domestic market access. The U.S. implemented a one-year
examination of unfair barriers to U.S. goods that were exported to the Chinese market
(Stewart, 2004). The USTR stated that they would impose a penalty duty if China
could not establish an agreement by October 10th. At the final negotiation, China
negotiated a deal with the U.S. and promised to remove trade barriers for a number of
different products over the next five years (Bown and McCulloch, 2009).
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The third and fourth special 301 investigations of China were also related to
intellectual property rights; therefore, China issued the second and third China-U.S.
agreement regarding intellectual property rights protection in succession (Morrison,
2011; Zeng, 2002).
The last section 301 investigation about China’s government support for cleanenergy exports was implemented on January 9th, 2010 (USTR, 2010; Robertson,
2010). The USTR “accepted [the] petition, filed by the United Steelworkers under
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act” (Brown, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/opinion/18brown) and required a bilateral consultation
with China within 90 days. In December 2010, the U.S. declared that it would solve
this problem under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), and China
agreed to revise the law regarding the trading subsidy. The past five investigations all
ended up with the agreements or compromises - the U.S. rarely used the retaliatory
measures to solve the unfair trade practices (Xu, 2008).
The trade deficit is the crucial reason that impelled the U.S. to initiate section 301
investigations of other countries. According to the record of the USTR, “China is
currently our largest goods trading partner with $578.6 billion in total (two way)
goods trade during 2016” (USTR, 2017, www. ustr.gov/countries-regions/chinamongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china). Besides the merchandise imports and
exports, China’s fixed exchange rate is also blamed by the U.S. government. The U.S.
claimed that the application of the fixed exchange rate led to the increasing trade
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deficit between the U.S. and China, which would aggravate the unemployment rate,
especially in the areas were China had significant competitive advantages (The
Economist, 2005). Furthermore, China can be as competitive as the U.S. in the U.S.
export domain market after China’s currency, the RMB, is pegged to the U.S. dollar
(Lou, 2004).
In addition to China, the U.S. also investigated several countries under the section
301, such as Japan, who is currently the 4th largest goods trading partner with the U.S.
(USTR, 2017). During the 1980s and 1990s, Japan was almost the largest trading
partner of the U.S., similar to the situation of China nowadays. At that time, Japan
mainly focused on the exports, which resulted in their vast trade surplus with the U.S.
(Bown and McCulloch, 2009). There are two remarkable section 301 investigations of
Japan that are worth learning from; the first investigation was related to the
semiconductor, ending in 1987 (Araki, 2004). The USTR accepted the petition of the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association and asserted that the Japanese government
set production barriers in the Japanese semiconductor market. The investigation
officially started on July 11th, 1985. After a year-long negotiation, on July 31st, 1986,
Japan finished up with an agreement ad referendum, opening the domestic
semiconductor market, and promising no longer to dump semiconductors to either the
U.S. or any other country (Fisher & Steinhardt IIIs, 1982).
Another investigation occurred in 1994, aimed at the auto parts industry (Stern,
2000). Japan was reported by the USTR for “restrict[ing] or deny[ing] U.S. auto parts
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suppliers access to the auto parts replacement and accessories market in Japan”
(Araki, 2004, p.10). However, at this time, Japan required a consultation under the
Settlement of Disputes of WTO. If the U.S. continued to impose unilateral retaliatory
methods and violate the WTO rules, Japan would also require a panel. Ultimately, the
U.S. had to terminate the section 301 investigation and reached a “satisfactory
resolution” with Japan (Araki, 2004).
Because of the appearance of the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2017), the
two investigations of Japan had the similar situations, but different results. WTO has
well-established agreements to regulate anti-dumping and to settle disputes (WTO,
2017). The USTR needs to adjust its way to implement the section 301 investigations
under the WTO agreements. Chen (2003) argued that the U.S. Executive
Representative signed the WTO agreement without changing section 301, letting the
U.S. “gain advantages from both sides”. The U.S. can choose to abide by the
international conventions or to continue to implement section 301 investigation,
depending on which method brings the most favorable results; however, the U.S.
faces the dilemma of whether to use the Unilateralism policy or multilateralism policy
or not (Gero & Lannan, 1995). The multilateralism policy will certainly open the U.S.
market up to other countries more than before, which will lead to trade deficit
increases. Moreover, the unilateralism policy, like section 301, is always deemed to
be unfair, and results in adverse reactions from other trading partners (Thomas &
Elliott 1992).
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Bown and Muculloch (2005, 2009) studied the U.S.-China and US-Japan trade
policies. In the two articles, the writers analyzed the differences between U.S.
imports-exports towards China and Japan. The authors also suggested that Asian
countries that would like to choose the export-oriented path should take the cases of
China and Japan as lessons to learn.
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METHODOLOGY
Two methods were employed for this research paper; the first method was
primary and secondary sourced research. This research used two kinds of channels for
collecting data. First, library research was the main source – the section 301
investigation had been used in many countries. After the analysis, the paper’s focus
was narrowed down to Japan and China. According to Bardach and Patashnik (2016),
using the concept of a proxy was a useful method to analyze the problems that were
similar to those that had happened in the past. Past studies demonstrated the impacts
and outcomes of previous section 301 investigations, which could provide the
background and could be indicators of the trends and issues to be addressed in the
upcoming investigation. Secondary resources would be the official websites. The
terminology like “section 301” is explained clearly by the Trade Act of 1974. The
regulatory processes for protection intellectual property by the USTR and the
regulatory process by the WTO could be found from both past researches and official
websites, which were used for comparing and contrasting.
The second method was the interview – companies’ senior managers, government
staff members, and industry association members were three categories of people to
be interviewed for this research. Those who were in the management of the regulated
companies were chosen to be interviewees because they were fully knowledgeable
about companies’ affairs, and might be contributing to making decisions regarding the
investigations. The second subject was the policy-makers; they had a better
understanding of the process and might better understand the results that the
19

governments want to gain by the section 301 investigation. The third group of
participants was the industry association members. Industry associations were
subjects that applied the investigation, hence their opinions were worth studying as
well. Since the research focused on analyzing the section 301 investigation between
the U.S. and China, the interviewees were chosen from those two countries.
Of those interviewed, six were from senior management of affected companies,
two were government policy makers, and one were industry association members.
Overall three were Chinese and six were American. To ensure candor during the
interviews, respondents are identified only by a randomly selected letter.
After collecting all the data that were used by this project, this analysis of
upcoming section 301 investigation used outcome evaluation, based on the Sylvia and
Sylvia’s (2012) program evaluation method. The program evaluation acted in
accordance with a four-phase approach, following the order of defining problems,
finding solutions, implementing, assessing how effective the solutions are.
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Program Evaluation
Phase 1
Problem
Identification

Phase 2
Solutions

Phase 3
Section 301
Investigation
Implementation

Phase 4
Effectiveness

China’s violation of
intellectual property
rights

Section 301
investigation

Evaluated the
results of past
three
investigations of
China and Japan

Analyzed the
information that
is collected from
interviews;
Compared
regulatory
processes of the
USTR and the
WTO

Hearings
American companies
experienced business
espionage and hacking
to illegally acquire
intellectual property

Results of
investigation
China’s
response

(Mutual
agreements;
memorandum of
understanding;
trade war…)

(Stop dumping;
open domestic
market; revised
national laws…)
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FINDINGS
The China-U.S. Relationship in Intellectual Property Area
From the U.S. point of view
The American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham China) is a non-profit
and non-government organization, having members of more than 3,300 individuals
from 900 American-based companies across China. AmCham China conducts surveys
of their members from late October to late November every year and generates the
Chinese business climate report based on the result of surveys. “Most respondents are
global in nature, and China makes up at least a 10% share of global revenue for
almost 50% of member companies” (AmCham China, 2017, p.13). According to the
2017 China Business Climate Survey Report, the majority of members of the
AmCham China continued facing the problems of getting growth and profits. “In
2016, 58% of survey respondents reported positive revenue growth in China, up from
a low of 55% in 2015, but still far from historical levels of more than 70%. More
companies also say that their China operations were profitable in 2016 (68% vs. 64%
in 2015), but 80% say their margins in China are less than or only equal to their
global average” (AmCham China, 2017, p.4). However, the 2018 report shows that,
the stabilizing economy policies made by China’s 19th Party Congress as well as the
Trump administration’s first visit to China gave confidence to the U.S. companies.
36% of the businesses surveyed said that they believed that the economic relationship
between the two countries will improve, which is much higher than the 17% of last
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year (AmCham China, 2018). 46% of members considered that China’s government
will further open the domestic market, which is 12% higher than the last year’s rate.
Although most members (64%) claimed revenue growth when comparing with last
year, the technology and other research and development (R&D) intensive industries
maintain the same level of revenue (AmCham China, 2018).
Although the U.S. companies feel optimistic about the increase of GDP, they are
still concerned about issues, such as the execution and the interpretation of laws and
regulations which are inconsistent between the two countries, as well as the adverse
regulatory environment and increasing protectionism. Members worry about unequal
supervision, enforcement, and preferential treatment by China’s government of
domestic enterprises, which may damage the revenue of foreign companies (AmCham
China, 2017). Among all the industries, members in the technology and other research
and development (R&D) intensive industries felt they received more unfair treatment
when compared to local companies (AmCham China, 2017; AmCham China, 2018).
It is also important to notice that the technology industry is the most optimistic about
Chinese business environment. More than 77% of respondents predicted that the
growth rate of industry market would reach or even exceed 5%. Trade barriers are one
of the most commonly mentioned reasons by the members (AmCham China, 2017;
AmCham China, 2018).
China is one of the top three priority investment destinations for most of
AmCham China’s members. The majority of them believed that innovation should be
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a crucial mission when operating in China. The development of digitization in China
is sharp, which will result in a huge market. However, there are still some barriers
faced by the companies, such as intellectual property protection and data security
(AmCham China, 2017). In both the 2017 and 2018 reports, member businesses
expressed hope that China’s government will improve fairness, and provide a
predictable and transparent regulatory process, which will greatly influence their
investment level in China (AmCham China, 2017; AmCham China, 2018).
Besides that, they also had concerns regarding intellectual property protection in
China, which made them become very cautious when bringing intellectual property
into China’s market. Interviewee E (2018) said that they will be very cautious when
transferring technology directly to a Chinese company. They need to know about the
company, the technology, the intellectual property and also the relationship between
the company and the university that is giving the technology. “[In addition to that,]
some particular Chinese regulations require the licensor to guarantee the ‘quality’ of
what’s being licensed. [So] we far prefer to grant the license to a U.S. subsidiary of
the Chinese company”, said by the interviewee E (2018).
Of member companies, 52% thought that the intellectual property leaking and
treaties on data security would easily happen in China. When asked what the barriers
they thought would prevent them from increasing technology development in China
were, 27% thought that it would be the lack of intellectual protection, while 15 %
considered the requirement of technology transfer (AmCham China, 2018).
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Of the members surveyed, 25% said that the insufficient protection offered by the
text of IP-related laws and regulations are the most crucial challenges to their
companies. Another 24% thought that the difficulty prosecuting IP infringements in
court or via administrative measures was the most important issue. In addition, 14%
thought that the problem was IP theft by employees, while 12% believed that the
licensing constraints were the root of the problem (AmCham China, 2017; AmCham
China, 2018). Most respondents said that the technology and proprietary knowledge
that they shared with China’s business partners were the same as what they shared
with other overseas business partners (AmCham China, 2017; AmCham China,
2018).
Interviewee I (2018) who is in charge of the technology transfer and the patent in
a joint-venture company, said that he does not really have an opinion about
technology transfer between China and the U.S. He considers the more important
issues to be that, due to the differences of the legislation framework and enforcement
mechanism between the countries, technology transfers and patent grant processes
should be very careful and prudent. Interviewee I (2018) said that the U.S. parent
company often chooses the cooperation methods depending on the competitive
advantage of the Chinese partner. “We would consider joint ventures if synergies in
operational excellence or cost efficiency excel. Otherwise, other formalities of
collaboration will be evaluated including the technology transfers, partnership, etc.”
(interviewee I, 2018), said the manager. For the question of the lifetime of the patent,
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the manger claimed that the longer, the better. He did not have any comments on the
recent section 301 investigation, and he only focused on the business between the
U.S. and China (interviewee I, 2018).
However, most of member companies just have concerns about intellectual
property protection, which barely influences their investment or business in China. Of
the members surveyed, 20% said that letting them take the increased control of their
data and reducing the need for local business partners of joint venture companies has
not had a significant impact on increasing their investment level. Another 29% of
them thought there was a somewhat significant impact. Only 11% thought that change
in that area will have an extremely significant influence. When asked about the policy
change in reducing the needs in technology transfer, 19% of members thought that it
does not have any influence at all on their future investment, while 27% believed it
will have somewhat of a significant influence. Only 6% of members thought the
influence would be extreme (AmCham China, 2018).
Interviewing the interviewee F (2018) revealed that he holds a positive attitude
regarding technology transfer between the U.S. and China. When collaborating with
Chinese companies, they prefer to have a strong and close relationship with their
clients. They will play a more active role “if the client is not very sophisticated”
(interviewee F, 2018). They are also inclined to build a long-term relationship.
Therefore, they will provide complimentary services to build and maintain these
relationships. Since interviewee F works in a company that concentrates on the U.S.
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intellectual property law, they encounter with various issues and have various
concerns for each transaction. Overall, they will pay attention to the purpose of the
transfer, the parties involved in the transaction, and the technology per se. Regarding
the question of a patents’ lifeline, interviewee F thought that it would vary with the
speed of technology development ideally (interviewee F, 2018).
Interviewee G and interviewee H (2018), who were coming from the same
company, said that they believe in technology transfer between China and the U.S.
The joint venture operators obey the agreement they made, and each party needs to
clarify their own rights and responsibilities. They argued that their company often
worries about losing the right or the control of the technology, or that the intellectual
property cannot be protected. Hence, the technology transfer will always be a onetime transfer. Both of the interviewees thought it was good to see that the U.S.’s
intellectual property rights can be protected under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, and they both supported the recent section 301 investigation (Interviewee G,
2018; Interviewee H, 2018).
Although member companies felt the limits of market access and discrimination
in law enforcement, they still had confidence that the Chinese market would keep
opening. Almost all member companies thought that China’s enforcement of
intellectual property rights has been improved in recent years. The majority of
members acknowledged that China has made great efforts in improving the
transparency of their policies (AmCham China, 2018).
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From the China point of view
China and the U.S. have different concerns regarding the trade and economy
fields. The U.S. focuses more on the trade deficit with China, market opining, the
RMB exchange rate, and IP protection. The U.S. hopes to protect its up-to-date
technology and innovation. China focuses more on carrying out the obligations of the
WTO, the U.S. export control to China, and Chinese companies’ investment in the
U.S and the U.S. abuses of trade remedy measures (China’s Ministry of Commerce,
2017).
In fact, the essence of the China-U.S. trade relationship is a win-win scenario
(Renmin, 2018). Although China has the largest and the most complete categories
industry systems globally, it is still in the middle-low end of the value chain. The U.S.
relies on the scientific and technological strength, innovation, and development of the
service industry, occupying the high-middle end of the value chain. Therefore, China
has the trade surplus during the cooperation while the U.S. has the profit surplus
(China’s Ministry of Commerce, 2017).
Besides that, trade between the two countries resulted in another advantage,
which is China promoted the U.S. industries’ upgrades to the direction of high
additional value and high-technical content, because China took charge of the midlow production chain. At the same time, the U.S. high-tech companies promoted the
development of related industries in China. Based on the data from A Research
Report on China-The U.S. Economic and Trade Relations released by China’s
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Ministry of Commerce, the trade deficit between China and the U.S. is not as huge as
the U.S. described before. China thought the volume of trade deficit was exaggerated
by the U.S. According to the calculation on the Chinese part, the trade surplus
between the two countries was $254 billion in 2016, but the U.S. claimed that the
trade deficit was $366 billion (China’s Chamber of Commerce, 2017). There was a
$112 billion difference between the two results. The difference could be caused by
many reasons, such as statistical discrepancy, carrying trade, and so on. In the past ten
years, the trade deficit between China and the U.S. has been getting better. In 2016,
China’s current account surplus accounted for 1.9% of the GDP, which is in an
internationally recognized and reasonable range (China’ Chamber of Commerce,
2017).
China’s Chamber of Commerce report (2017) indicated that China's trade surplus
is mainly the result of market-based participants from enterprises and consumers
making economic decisions from both ends of supply and demand. It is not caused by
government intervention. Both China and the U.S. need to strive to solve the trade
deficit issue, which is not merely the problem of China.
In the past ten years, the average growth rate of U.S. exports to China was
approximately 3 times that of U.S. exports. After China joined in to the WTO, the
volume of the U.S. exports to China increased by 500%. In the service industry, the
U.S. kept the long-term surplus. According to the estimate of the US-China Business
Council, the bilateral investments between China and the U.S. contributed $216
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billion to the U.S. GDP and supported 2,600,000 employment positions in 2015
(China’s Chamber of Commerce, 2017). According to the report, trade deficit
between the two countries did not directly cause the reduction of U.S. employment.
The main reasons for the U.S. insufficient job opportunities were skill improvement
and upgrading of industries (China’s Chamber of Commerce, 2017).
The last section 301 investigation that the U.S. implemented to China related to
steel export. The steel trade has been still an issue between the two countries. China’s
Chamber of Commerce argued that the Chinese steel industry is established in
domestic production, which not only discourages steel exports, but also adopts a
series of measures to control exports. China’s exports of steel to the United States
account for a small proportion of the total imports of the U.S.. Affected by numerous
anti-dumping and countervailing measures taken by the U.S. against Chinese steel
products, China’s steel exports to the United States have been declining year by year
in the past decade (China’s Chamber of Commerce, 2017).
For a long time, technology, transportation and communication were greatly
affected by the strict high-tech export control implemented by the U.S, which meant
that lots of the U.S. high-tech products could not be exported to China. According to
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS), from 2012 to 2014, China
ranked first in the list of country-level foreign investment countries in the United
States for three consecutive years, and reviewed a total of 68 investment projects.
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However, in fact, China’s investment accounts for less than 1% of the total foreign
investment that the U.S. attracts (Dollar, 2017).
Interviewee B (2017) said that, in the Trump administration, any deal with the
Chinese government will attract the attention of the CFIUS. The U.S. government
may reject Chinese acquisitions of American assets because of a concern for
homeland security. But the refusal may come because of many subjective factors. The
chances of successfully passing the examination of the CFIUS have slipped away
(Interviewee B, 2017). In practice, the U.S. government will focus on the capital
sources and ownership structure of acquiring firms when it is investigating
acquisitions. The U.S. government mainly inspects the cooperating banks when
assessing the capital sources. Communication technology and the big data industry
are the most sensitive industries (Interviewee B, 2017).
The cost to the U.S. of intellectual property protection
The IP commission was set up in 2012 and exists for three reasons. First, it
records and assesses the causes and effects of international intellectual property thefts
that harm the U.S. Secondly, the commission focuses on the actions of China and
other infringers in international intellectual property theft. Thirdly, it “[proposes]
appropriate U.S. policy responses that would mitigate ongoing and future damage and
obtain greater enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) by China and other
infringers” (IP Commission, 2017, p.1). Based on the calculations of the IP
Commission, the annual loss for the U.S. economy in counterfeit goods, pirated
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software, and theft of trade secrets exceeded $225 billion and reached $600 billion. At
this rate, in the past three years, the U.S. economy lost $1.2 trillion because of
intellectual property theft issues (IP Commission, 2017).
The IP commission divided IP theft into three categories, which are counterfeit
and pirated tangible goods, pirated software, and the theft of trade secret. Annually,
the U.S. will import between $58 billion and $118 billion worth of counterfeit goods
into the domestic market. Meanwhile, $85 billions worth of counterfeit U.S. goods
will be sold worldwide. Although counterfeit goods have a price difference compared
to authentic products, at least 20% of authentic products are substituted by counterfeit
ones (IP commission, 2017).
“Ease of downloading software, ubiquitous use of software across industries and
countries, and inadequate surveys” (IP commission, 2017, p.2) are there main reasons
leading to the rampant existence of pirated software, which will cost the U.S.
approximately $18 billion.
Trade secret theft has always been invisible, so it may not be realized by the
companies. Hence, the cost of trade secret theft is hard to estimated and calculate.
New estimations show that 1% to 3% of the GDP is the price of trade secret theft,
which is between $180 billion and $540 billion (IP commission, 2017).
However, the cost of IP theft is not only the cost of intellectual property
protection, but also the cost of the immediate and long-term competitive advantages
that the U.S. loses, and the cost of improving the laws and regulations. During the
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hearing, the IP commission argued that the U.S. government needs to do more to
prevent intellectual property theft. In the future, along with the development of
technology, intellectual property will become more vulnerable (IP commission,
2017).
The IP Commission stated that the U.S. government sufficiently values the
importance of IP-intensive industries to domestic markets. IP-intensive industries
contributed 38% of the GDP in 2014. The percentage is probably higher nowadays, so
it may occupy 40% of the U.S.’s GDP, based on the estimation of the U.S. In
addition, IP-intensive industries employ approximately 35% of the labor force, which
is 56 million jobs. Generally, the wage in IP-intensive industries is higher than the
wage in non-IP-intensive industries (IP commission, 2017).
After the release the 2013 version IP Commission Report, the U.S. government
made significant law enforcement changes and defensive measures, such as the
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, which truly led to several positive improvements.
In addition, the intellectual protection received more attention than before. The U.S.
government also made some developments after releasing the report. First of all, the
Department of Justice prosecuted five of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
officers, claiming that the PLA officers illegally invaded the U.S. companies’
networks and stole trade secrets and sensitive information. Since the PLA officers will
probably never appear in the U.S. courts, these actions mainly serve as a warning to
other hackers from the PLA units. The U.S. government also published new acts and
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laws with regards to personal protection, national level protection and protection
efforts, such as 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, National Cybersecurity
Protection Act of 2014, and Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 (IP
commission, 2017).
However, there were some problems created during the regulation procedures and
counting processes. First, foreign lawbreakers are hard to bring to trial in the U.S..
Nowadays, the number of high-tech companies is increasing, which leads to increased
costs for intellectual property protection. The damage caused by counterfeiting may
be greater than what was estimated because of the difficulty of measuring the amount
of IP theft. For instance, the merchants may not even be able to tell the true product
from the counterfeit one. The traces of IP theft are hard to detect. Companies
sometimes are not willing to make it widely known that there are counterfeit versions
of their products in order to keep the market shares.
Of counterfeit goods coming into the U.S. market, 52% are from China. The
estimated cost of IP theft may be merely a small fraction of the total. The loss of
cutting-edge technology and innovation could result in the loss of the best jobs for
Americans. The high-tech industries, such as the information and communication
industries, are motivating forces of development for the future U.S., which is the
potential cost and loss of intellectual property theft (IP commission, 2017). Based on
the report of the IP Commission (2017), China is the principal IP infringer, making up
87% of counterfeit goods imported into the U.S. market.
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The IP commission testified at the hearing regarding China’s actions of
Technology Transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The IP Commission
report can be seen as a complementary document to the section 301 investigation. The
testimony was argued from four points of view: China’s policies, example cases, cost
and damage to the U.S. caused by China’s actions, and how the U.S. uses both
unilateral and multilateral measures to confront intellectual property theft (IP
commission, 2017; Ellings, 2017).
It was the same with the report released by AmCham China. After interviewing
U.S. companies, the IP Commission concluded that China was the key perpetrator of
intellectual property infringement. During the hearing, the IP commission listed ten
vulnerable sectors that may be targeted by intellectual property theft, which are
information technology, numerical control tools and robotics, aerospace products,
ocean engineering equipment and advanced ships, railway equipment, energy saving
and new energy vehicles, power equipment, new materials, medicine and medical
devices, and agricultural machinery. According to the testimony given by the IP
commission (2017), China uses four measures for getting the intellectual property.
First of all, it is the espionage with the support of new technology. Secondly, foreign
companies are able to use their intellectual property exchange to get access to China’s
market or escape tedious procedures. Thirdly, China’s government can use policies to
regulate the actions of foreign companies, which will weaken the competitive
advantages of foreign companies to some extent. Last but not least, foreign companies

35

need to share their data and intellectual property with local businesses and allow
China’s government to have full access to their source code (IP commission, 2017).
The status quo of China’s intellectual property protection
Both the IP commission and USTR recognized the improvements in China’s
intellectual property protection laws. China also signed an “expanded memorandum
of understanding with the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center
of the Department of Homeland Security” (IP Commission, 2017, p.13). In addition,
the Chinese government also realized the insufficiencies of intellectual property
protection and wished to change from a large IP country to a strong IP country,
publishing an act entitled Opinion of the State Council on Accelerating the
Construction of Intellectual Property Powers for China as an Intellectual Property
Strong Country under the New Situation-Division of Tasks. In China’s new five-year
plan, there are sectors for special support of the high-tech sector and of intellectual
property protection, which lists approximately 75 priority technologies (IP
Commission testimony, 2017). China started having IP courts in 2014 and is still
improving its acts and regulations. The new plan issued by the State Council
accelerates the enhancement of the IP court system and further reduces the damage to
the intellectual property theft victim (IP Commission testimony, 2017). China’s
president Xi Jinping also pays attention to the protection of intellectual property,
saying that an intellectual property infringer should be punished more severely than
before. Besides that, a four-month crackdown was launched by China’s Ministry of
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Commerce to protect the legal rights of companies with foreign investors (Wu, 2018).
Joining the WTO improved the construction of China’s intellectual property
protection system to a great extent (IP commission, 2017).
China thought, after years of hard work, that it had already built a relatively
complete intellectual property protection regulation system, setting up intellectual
property court. China State Council also established the National Leading Group to
Combat Infringement and Counterfeiting, which positively promotes long-time
mechanism construction. From the aspect of legislation, judicial, and enforcement,
China has significant improvements in all three (China’s Chamber of Commerce,
2017).
Regulatory Processes for Protecting Intellectual Property by the WTO
Along with the regulation of the WTO, disputes regarding intellectual property
protection between member nations will go through consultation processes as the first
step. If consultation is not able to settle a dispute, the adjudication panel will start to
be used (WTO, 2018).
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS) under the WTO was signed at the Marrakesh
Ministerial Meeting in April 1994, as part of a package deal with the other Uruguay
Round Agreements, and it went into effect in January 1995 (Fukunage, 2008). It
“address[es] the applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant
international intellectual property agreements; the provision of adequate intellectual
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property rights; the provision of effective enforcement measures for those rights;
multilateral dispute settlement; and transitional arrangements” (WTO website, 2018,
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm). The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1971) and the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) are included in the TRIPS agreement. The
TRIPS regulates patent terms, regulations of using patents, trademarks, unfair
competition, national regulators, and so on (WTO website, 2018).
Until 2008, the WTO DSM had taken over 26 disputes from the TRIPS and
solved most of them. Complainants generally will claim from three aspects, which are
statute, application, and ineffectiveness of domestic remedies. The statute claims are
more concerned about whether countries meet their laws, regulations, or legislations
with obligations under the TRIPS, which “provide general rules as opposed to casespecific applications of the rules” (Fukunage, 2008, p.890). Application claims focus
on countries that implanted intellectual property regulations ineffectively. Lastly,
claims pay more attention to remedy measures (Fukunage, 2008).
In 2007, the U.S. appealed the WTO DSM to form a panel to settle a dispute with
China in the intellectual protection area. The U.S. claimed that China violated Articles
61, 46, and 41.1 of the TRIPS, which can be divided into three categories: (1) China’s
thresholds of punishment in the area of intellectual property area are too high to be
implemented; (2) China’s customs authorities ineffectively deals with counterfeit; (3)
the insufficiency of China’s patent and copyright protection (Yu, 2011).
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China responded to these claims successively. For the first claim, China argued
that different circumstance and criminal laws and methods of calculation resulted in
the U.S. government considering the thresholds of China’s criminal procedure as high
(Yu, 2011). The WTO panel thought the U.S. failed to provide the sufficiently
substantial evidences. With regards to the second claim, China argued that its customs
authorities have enough discretion to regulate counterfeit and infringing goods and
provide remedial measures. Although the WTO acknowledged the efforts of China on
intellectual property protection and affirmed that China has met with the minimum
standard, China still lost the second claim because of failure to build effective
restraints. China also lost the third claim because the WTO panel considered that the
Chinese Copyright Law was not completely consistent with the TRIPS (Yu, 2011).
The TRIPS allows member countries to choose appropriate methods to protect
their intellectual property. Members will enforce the TRIPS combined with their own
regulations, which gives members great discretion and leaves some space for less
developed countries. The WTO encourages less developed countries to use DSM to
resolve disputes. Just because of that, developing countries become more frequent
users of the WTO DSM (Yu, 2011).
The actions of technology transfer and intellectual property protection usually are
the behaviors of individuals rather than the responsibility of the governments, which
is also a viewpoint emphasized by the WTO. Hence, the governments do not need to
undertake all responsibilities and costs. The TRIPS also reserves space for member
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countries with different backgrounds to explain and translate the Agreement
depending on their situations (Yu, 2011).
All the members that constitute the TRIPS council are in charge of overseeing the
implementation of the TRIPS. The TRIPS council has five roles, which are
monitoring, consultation, technical cooperation, review and negotiation, and review
agreement (WTO website, 2018). Comparing other councils in the WTO, the Council
for the TRIPS has the primary role of receiving and publishing information rather
than consultation and resolving disputes between countries. Therefore, subsequent
development of negotiation functions of the Council for TRIPS is a significant step
for TRIPS (Yu, 2011; WIPO website, 2018). Another important function of the
Council for TRIPS is serving as a monitoring body, analyzing and evaluating
intellectual property regulations and the laws of member countries. According to the
section 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, the
Council needed to implement an annual transitional review until 2009 to ensure that
the intellectual property regulations of China meet the requirements of the TRIPS.
The Council also helps with each of the member countries to share their experiences
related to implementation. The Council tries to prevent the disputes and resolve them
before they are presented to the panel (Yu, 2011).
An effective DSM is the guarantee of effective of minimum standards policies
under the TRIPS. Panel and strict time-frames further ensure the effectiveness of the
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TRIPS. Moreover, DSM also ensures that an individual country cannot hold back the
panel (Yu, 2011).
Part III of the TRIPS provides minimum standards for the enforcement of IP
rights, which provides more elaborate criteria and makes up for the drawbacks of the
WIPO. The TRIPS, as the part of package signed by WTO members, includes more
developed and developing countries. Although the TRIPS emphasizes complying with
the minimum standards, it also encourages the appearance of high standards (Yu,
2011).
Regulatory Processes for Protecting Intellectual Property by the USTR
After the USTR initiated the section 301 investigation, a hearing held by the
inter-agency section 301 committee should occur to hear the opinion of the public,
interest groups, and other departments. After the hearing, the USTR should receive
written comments by the midnight on September 28, 2018. This time, the USTR
investigated the actions of China from four aspects (Federal Register, 2017). First,
China’s government used a variety of tools to force the U.S. companies to transfer
technology. Secondly, the Chinese government reduced the competitive advantages of
the U.S. companies in licensing procedures and negotiations and undermined the
control of U.S. companies over their technology. Thirdly, China’s government
participated in the acquisition of U.S. companies and obtained cutting-edge
technology from these investments. Fourth, China’s government was charged with
stealing trade secrets from U.S. companies. The USTR should have results within 12
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months from the date of releasing the investigation, after consulting with appropriate
departments and also with China’s government (Federal Register, 2017).
The New Progress of The Section 301 Investigation
After just over 100 days from launching the section 301 investigation, the USTR
already finished a draft of the investigation report and shared it with other
departments for checking and overseeing (Asia Times Staff, 2017). China responded
that it prepared for the upcoming unilateral trade action. According to a report
published in 2017 December, a spokesperson from the USTR claimed that the U.S.
will do anything to stop the unfair action of China (Behsudi, 2017). The section 301
investigation is the first one of many that the Trump administration will implement to
China.
On March 22nd, 2018, the U.S. President Donald Trump signed the executive
order, claiming what the results and possible actions that may be taken by the U.S.
were, related to the recent section 301 investigation of China’s Laws, Policies,
Practices, or Actions related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and
innovation. After a public hearing, two rounds of public written commentary, and
consultation with appropriate departments and section 301 Committee, USTR had
four major findings. First, “China uses foreign ownership restrictions to require or
pressure technology transfer from U.S companies to Chinese entities” (Trump, 2018,
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-actions-unitedstates-related-section-301-investigation/), such as forced joint venture requirements
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and investment restrictions. China also uses the differences between its laws and the
U.S.’s laws to put pressure on U.S. companies to transfer technology, which
“undermines the values of U.S investments and technology and weakens the global
competitiveness of U.S. firms” (Trump, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-memorandum-actions-united-states-related-section-301investigation/). Secondly, China puts up substantial barriers and restrictions, such as
limits on technology licensing terms and procedures, in actions and investments of
U.S. companies, which weakens the bargaining chip of U.S. companies and gives the
unfair advantage to China’s companies (Breuninger and Tausche, 2018). Thirdly,
China’s companies directly invest in U.S. companies in order to get cutting edge
technologies and intellectual property, and then transfer the technology into mass
production to fit with China’s own industry strategies. Fourthly, China’s government
has “unauthorized access to intellectual property, trade secrets, or confidential
business information to support [its] strategic development goals” (Trump, 2018,
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-actions-unitedstates-related-section-301-investigation/).
Regarding the key results mentioned before, the U.S. government came up with
three measures. First of all, the U.S. government will increase tariffs by 25 % on
certain types of Chinese products, which is equivalent to $50 billion. The USTR
calculated that was the annual harm to the U.S. caused by China’s inappropriate

43

actions. According to the executive order, the list of products needs to be provided
within 15 days after the memorandum (USTR, 2018).
Secondly, the USTR applied consultation via the dispute settlement mechanism
of World Trade Organization (WTO) to address China’s discriminatory licensing
practices (Trump, 2018). According to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the U.S. government argued that China violated
Article 3 and Article 28, claiming that China gives disparate treatment to foreign
intellectual property rights holders and failed to protect the patents of foreign holders
(USTR, 2018). The USTR also claimed that, “China’s laws provide less favorable
treatment of foreign entities than the comparable treatment of domestic Chinese
entities” (USTR, 2018, www.ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2018/march/following-president-trump’s-section). Consultations at the WTO
will be the first step taken by the DSM. If the WTO consultations do not go as well as
expected, the WTO adjudication panel will be the next step (WTO, 2018).
As the last step, the U.S. government will restrict the direct investment of China’s
companies in key U.S. technology, such as the semiconductor industry, which will be
taken charge of by the Secretary of the Treasury (Lexology, 2018; Federal Register,
2018). The U.S. will limit the same sectors in which China’s government restricts the
investment of U.S. companies (CSIS, 2018). The U.S. government used all the
available measures to respond to China’s action that they thought were harmful to the
U.S. economy (Executive Office of the President, 2018).
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During the hearing, members of the China Chambers of Commerce, China
Enterprise Confederation, and Intellectual Property Law Society participated and
responded to the following aspects. They argued that China’s government does not
have technology transfer requirements in its laws. Technology transfers are done
voluntary and independently, based on the drive of benefits. The “Made in China
2025” is just an initiative that is provided for the development of China’s economy
(Fischer et al., 2017).
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ANALYSIS
The TRIPS agreement under the WTO system has three important improvements.
The main purpose of the TRIPS is to remove discrimination between different
countries in laws and regulations on the national level. When comparing it with
WIPO, the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention, the TRIPS is more
comprehensive, combing all types of intellectual property protection together. The
Paris Convention, as one of the predecessors of the TRIPS, aims to protect intellectual
property rights, which is one of the first international agreements in the intellectual
property protection area.
Its second merit is that “TRIPS established standards for enforcement by
incorporating domestic procedures and remedies to ensure the protection of
intellectual property rights” (Monten, 2005, p.395). The third advantage is the
effective dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), which guarantees the enforcement of
the Agreement (Monten, 2005).
The TRIPS also complies with the “Most-Favored Nation” clause that was raised
by the WTO, which means that if a nation gives any favor or advantage to another
member nation, it should also give the same advantage to other members. The MostFavored Nation treatment further eliminated the discrimination between member
countries.
From another side, TRIPS still has its disadvantages. In the first five years of the
TRIPS agreement, DSM settled six cases out of 23. One of them was a dispute
regarding patent laws between the U.S. and Japan. The majority of disputes could be
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solved before being sent to the WTO DSM. Nearly all disputes happened between
developed countries and developing countries. Developed countries are always the
complainants while developing countries are the respondents (Yu, 2011). Companies
with intellectual property are mostly in developed countries, which makes developed
countries more likely to take actions to protect IP.
After 2001, the WTO DSU only solved three disputes. The limitations of the
WTO started appearing. Complaints and respondents can come up with a temporary
agreement or memorandum of understanding that usually has a time limit (Yu, 2011).
Respondents are able to not do anything, and waiting means that the agreement loses
its effectiveness. Complainants think that they won the dispute, but the dispute is
actually was not solved at all, such as the case between the European Community and
the U.S.. Among all disputes that were solved by the WTO, nearly 85% of them were
found to have at least one violation (Fukunage, 2008). The enforcement of WTO
report is the drawback, which is that there are not mandatory laws that need to be
enforced.
In addition, the TRIPS does not have relevant clauses to regulate technology and
innovation transfer. Another drawback is that the TRIPS does not have enough
authority to resolve disputes fundamentally. The third shortcoming is that
complainants cannot know whether respondents implement remedial measures or not
(Monten, 2005). Based on the TRIPS, complainant countries need to provide
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sufficient proof of the infringement of other countries. Moreover, the evidence is
sometimes hard to obtain.
Although the WTO has drawbacks that were mentioned above, member countries
still considered that the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO was more
effective and stronger (Fukunage, 2008). Compared to investigations by section 301
of the Trade Act of 1974, many countries would rather solve disputes under the WTO
DSM. Most countries believe that the section 301 investigation is an unpleasant
measure (Monten, 2005).
In the history of the section 301 investigation, the country that was investigated
would change or amend its legislation or signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S.,
promising to remedy its actions under strong pressure from the U.S.. (Monten, 2005).
Interviewee A (2017) said that the section 301 investigation that the USTR had
previously implemented mainly focused on Japan and the European Community
countries at that time. The U.S. can always get the results that they are satisfied with.
Especially during the 20th century- in the 1980s to the early 1990s to be exact - Japan
compromised with the U.S. by voluntarily restricting their exports, which actually
violated the regulations of the WTO (interviewee A, 2007).
Based on U.S. Code, the USTR should use DSM under the WTO first, before it
launches its own section 301 investigation. However, in the recent section 301
investigation, the U.S. sought the consultation of the WTO after it had the result of
the USTR investigation.
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Although, the U.S. signed the TRIPS agreement, it merely amended its
regulations to fit with the Agreement. The U.S. wants the role of section 301 to
remain strong and effective when trading with other countries. A foreign country will
be charged with violating the U.S. IP protection regulations even if it meets with the
standards of the TRIPS. Among developing member countries, WTO praised China
for meticulously carrying out the minimum standards of the TRIPS. From the stance
of the WTO, it does not want a member country to use unilateral measures against
other member countries. The WTO also claimed that section 301 is in the “prime facie
violation” of Article 23 of the WTO DSU. If the U.S. keeps using unilateral measures
like the section 301 investigation, it will undermine the established international order
and international DSM, which will result in global agreements like the TRIPS losing
their effectiveness (Monten, 2005). Although the WTO sometimes cannot sufficiently
take effect, it still prevents the world from going back to the “Wild West” before the
appearance of the WTO (Capri, 2017).
China hopes to resolve the dispute via the WTO DSM from the beginning to the
end (Capri, 2017; Renmin, 2018). According to the Report published by China’s
Ministry of Commerce (2017), the legal protection of the trade relationship between
China and the U.S. is WTO and multi-bilateral agreements. Regulations of the WTO
provide stable and strong institutional guarantees to bilateral relations between the
two parties. The trade relationship between China and the U.S. is under the frame of
the WTO rules (China’s Chamber of Commerce, 2017). Beijing will work on
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opposing the unilateral measure of the U.S. and strive for a better situation with other
American trade partners. China will insist on maintaining the multilateral trade
system and preventing the world economy from the unilateral measures.
For the recent section 301 investigation, “China cited DS152 to make the claim
that unilateral trade restrictions taken by the U.S. via Section 301 would be
inconsistent with WTO rules” (World Trade, 2018, www.insidetrade.com/dailynews/us-china-tussle-over-section-301’s-compatibility-wto-rules-dsb). Two decades
ago, the European Union and the U.S. had a similar situation. After the panel, the
WTO claimed that powerful economic entities cannot threaten others with the
unilateral measures (Miles, 2018). Besides that, China claimed that the U.S. violated
the article 23 of the DSU. DSU Article 23 states that the WTO members shall use the
WTO dispute settlement system to seek redress for alleged the WTO violations as
opposed to acting unilaterally. It also states that “WTO members shall use the WTO
dispute settlement system to seek redress for alleged WTO violations as opposed to
acting unilaterally. The WTO states that members shall not determine that a violation
of WTO rules has occurred except through recourse to dispute settlement” (WTO,
2018, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm). The actions of the U.S.
government will undermine the function of WTO and of a multilateral mechanism.
In this case, keeping using the unliterary measures will possibility lead to a trade
war. However, the trade war is a lose-lose scenario. If the trade war begins, both
China and the U.S. will feel pain.
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The U.S. government increased the tariff and restricted the investments on the
innovation and technology industries, such as new energy vehicles and high-speed
transportation, which will have a negative influence on China’s “Made in China
2025” plan to some extent. The Chinese economy relies more on trade and export
when compared to the U.S. (Lawder, 2018). According to the data of the World Bank,
the total trade volume in 2016 of China was 37% of China’s GDP, while the total
trade volume only comprised 26% of the U.S. GDP. Besides, it is easier to find the
substitutes for China’s products (Zheng, 2018). For China, it is important to know
whether the American measures are temporary or permanent, and whether the trade
relationship between them will shift. The restricted areas included aerospace,
information and communication technology and machinery, which are crucial for the
China’s development plan (Bloomberg, 2018).
China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying (2018, www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1527756.shtml) said that “ [at] the
same time, as we all can see, it is exactly the U.S. that acts and speaks in a unilateral
manner and poses an unprecedented challenge to the multilateral trading system, over
which many WTO members have expressed their concern. We hope the US can look
at China correctly and take concrete actions to uphold [multilateral trade
arrangements]”. The spokesman of China's Ministry of Commerce argued that China
will not let others damage its rights. China already made full preparations to defend
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its legal rights (Renmin, 2018). The secretary of China’s Minister of Commerce, Fuli
Chen, claimed that the section 301 investigation violated the regulations of the WTO.
As responses, China will be increasing the tariffs on the same value of imports. A
few hours after the president’s memorandum, China announced the tariff on $3 billion
of imports, which will first influence the American exporters. The list of import
products tentatively includes seven categories and 128 taxable products. China also
planned levies on $50 billion worth of imports (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China
will adjust the plan in accordance with the regulations of the WTO. The U.S.
customer will feel the price of China’s imports increase. The U.S. manufactures see
disruption of the production chain because of losing the middle and lower reaches
(CSIS, 2018).
The targeted industries will follow two criteria. First, China needs to have
appropriate substitutes for the targeted industries. Secondly, the targeted industries
need to create significant influences in the U.S., such as agriculture and
transportation. Interviewee A (2017) claimed that if the U.S. government wishes to
conduct sanction measures, it needs to get the cooperation of American companies
that have been forced to translate their technology or lost intellectual property related
to trade with China. However, the majority of those multinational companies have
extensive market interest in China. They may risk losing the Chinese market. Hence,
they may need to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of doing so (interviewee,
A, 2017).
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“The incoming tariffs are the most significant to date from a president who
campaigned on a promise to correct the U.S.'s global trade imbalance, particularly
with China, and to revitalize U.S. manufacturing” (Diamond, 2018, www.cnn.com
/2018/03/22/politics/donald-trump-china-tariffs-trade-war/index.html). If the Chinese
information and communication technology exports were imposed with 25% tariffs,
the U.S. economy would lose about $332 billion in the next ten years.
Although China imposed tariffs on the U.S.’s agricultural productions, it does not
want to start the all-around war, and neither does the U.S. Although the president of
the U.S. signed the memorandum that appears to create tension between the two
countries, he still wants to solve trade issues via diplomatic measurers (Diamond,
2018). On the morning of Month 24th, the member of the Political Bureau of the
Chinese People’s Congress Central Committee He Liu, talked with the U.S.
Department of the Treasury and stated the Chinese stance, that China is ready to
protect its own rights and hopes to keep negotiating with the U.S.. (Xinhua, 2018).
A trade war will push China to focus on other markets, such as the “one belt one
road”. Interview C (2017) said that the “One Belt One Road” policy opened
unprecedented markets to Chinese enterprises. The U.S. companies may oppose the
Trump administration’s decision because they may think that China is an
indispensable market (Bloomberg, 2018).
The majority of member companies believed that bilateral relations between
China and the U.S. would influence the U.S. companies’ business growth in China to
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a great extent. A positive trade relation is important to all industries (AmCham China,
2018).
The two countries are in different stages of market economy developments. The
U.S. is the forerunner of the market economy, which has a more mature economic
structure. Besides that, the U.S. took the lead in establishing antitrust laws and
intellectual property protection laws at its founding. For instance, the U.S.
Constitution of 1787 makes the central government responsible to protect intellectual
property (Article 1, Section 8), and the U.S. published patent law and copyright law in
1790 (China’s Ministry of Commerce, 2017). Compared with that, China built up the
Socialist Market Economic System in 1992. In the past 20 years, although China has
improved a lot, these laws and regulations still need to be enhanced (China’s Ministry
of Commerce, 2017).
Interviewee D (2017) explained why the economic relationship between China
and the U.S. is becoming more and more tense. First, as the second economy, China
has an increasing number of competitive enterprises. For instance, Chinese companies
comprised 11 of the 50 most profitable enterprises chosen by “Fortune”, which is the
largest number on the list for any country except the U.S. Ten out of those 11 Chinese
enterprises on the list are state-owned, which shows that the Chinese government
plays a leading role in national economic development. Secondly, in recent years,
China’s overseas acquisitions have been growing rapidly. However, 60 % of
purchases, overseas trading activities, and outward foreign direct investments are
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accomplished by state-owned enterprises. Besides that, some industries that are
protected by the Chinese government, and many private enterprises, started to expand
their overseas business, which has made the market even more unbalanced. Taking
cloud computing industry as an example, Chinese companies are able to run
businesses simply by using a regular business license. However, the cloud service
providers from the U.S. do not even have the chance to apply for a business license in
China. The U.S. companies have to rely on local providers and cooperate with them
(AmCham China, 2017; AmCham China, 2018).
Interviewee C (2017) said that Chinese companies constantly accelerate the pace
of mixed ownership reform. On the other hand, Chinese companies speed up the
exploration of European markets.
Facing the current Chinese competitive environment and the U.S. – China
economic relationship, both interviewee C and interviewee D (2017) clearly believed
that the healthy economic development of both China and the U.S. are important to
one another.
The way to develop the trade relationship between China and the U.S. is to
realize the complementary advantages between the two countries. China has the
advantages on the manufacturing side and the U.S. has the advantages on the
technological side. China-U.S. economic and trade cooperation is the inevitable result
of the division of labor and the optimized allocation of resources under the
background of economic globalization. Trade and economic cooperation between
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China and the U.S. has more and more global influence. As members of the WTO and
APEC, China and the U.S. contributed to promoting the multilateral cooperation and
agreements. Before President Trump’s memorandum, China’s Premier Li Keqiang
said that China will open the market more and protect intellectual property during a
conference in Beijing (Wu, 2018). China and the U.S. are not opponents in the zerosum game, but are mutually benefiting friends.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. has a long history of using section 301 investigation to respond to unfair
trade activities with other countries. In the last century, Japan was the major object of
investigation. Gradually, China has developed and become the second economic
entity of the world, which also leads to more disputes with the U.S.. The majority of
section 301 investigations that the U.S. implemented against China related to
intellectual property protection, which resulted in the improvement of China’s
intellectual property protection regulations.
After the establishment of the WTO, China hopes that the WTO DSM can be
approached to resolve disputes between the two countries rather than using unilateral
measures. Although the WTO DSM has its own drawbacks in implementation
procedures, it is still a more fair and acceptable measure for each country. The recent
investigation regarding intellectual property protection leads up to a large-scale trade
war step by step. The WTO DSM will be the appropriate method to settle the dispute
and prevent a trade war from happening.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Questions
A. Company Senior Managers
1. What is your title in the company?
2. What is the export/import volume before the investigation?
3. What is the export/import volume after the investigation?
4. What do you think of the section 301 investigation initiated by the U.S. from
an enterprise perspective?
5. How do you think the section 301 investigation will influence your company?
6. If the company suffers the retaliatory measures by the U.S./China, what kind
of measures will be taken by the company?
7. Will the company’s US market/Chinese market will be changed because of the
section 301 investigation or not?
B. Government Staffs
1. Why did the Trump administration launch section 301 investigation of China?
2. What is the key field of the upcoming investigation?
3. What is the current status of the investigation?
4. What are retaliatory measures that may be taken by China/the U.S. after the
investigation?
5. How does the Chinese government prepare for the potential outcomes of the
investigation?
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6. What kind of measures will be taken by the Chinese government to react to
the investigation?
C. Industry Association Members
1. After the section 301 investigation, what are the industries that may be
punished by trade sanctions imposed in retaliation?
2. Are there any countermeasures from the perspective of the entire industry？
3. What is the role of the US-owned enterprises in the investigation implemented
by the US government?
4. Do the US-owned enterprises worry about the potential retaliatory measures
imposed by the Chinese government? If so, what are their corresponding
counteractions?
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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYM LIST

Term

Definition

AmCham China

The American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic
of China
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (WTO)
Dispute Settlement Understanding (WTO)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gross Domestic Product
Intellectual Property
The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property
People’s Liberation Army (People’s Republic of China)
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO)
U.S. Trade Representative
World Intellectual Property Organization
World Trade Organization
1886, protects copyright for intellectual and artistic works.
An Act to enhance the competitiveness of American industry,
and for other purposes.

APEC
CFIUS
DSM
DSU
GATT
GDP
IP
IP commission
PLA
TRIPS
USTR
WIPO
WTO
Berne Convention
Omnibus Foreign
Trade and
Competitiveness Act
of 1988
Paris Convention

Trade Act of 1974

Uruguay Round

1883, protects to industrial property in the widest sense,
including patents, trademarks, industrial designs, utility models,
service marks, trade names, geographical indications and the
repression of unfair competition.
An Act to promote the development of an open,
nondiscriminatory, and fair world economic system, to stimulate
fair and free competition between the United States and foreign
nations, to foster the economic growth of, and full employment
in, the United States, and for other purposes.
1986-1994, 8th round of multilateral trade negotiations
conducted within the framework of the (GATT), embracing 123
countries as "contracting parties".

60

SOURCES CONSULTED
Araki, I. (2004). Beyond aggressive legalism: Japan and the GATT/WTO dispute.
WTO and East Asia: New Perspectives, 149-176. ASIA, T. S.
Asia Times Staff. (2017, December 7). US Section 301 probe against China on fast
track. Asia times. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/article/us-section-301probe-china-fast-track/
Behsudi, A. (2017, December 5). USTR pressing ahead quickly in Section 301 probe
against China. Politico. Retrieved from
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-trade/2017/12/05/ustr-pressingahead-quickly-in-section-301-probe-against-china-040623
Bloomberg. (2018, March 23). China’s $3 billion tariff response shows xXi holding
back, for now. Bloomberg. Retrieved from
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-23/xi-holds-back-fire-astrump-poses-unprecedented-test-on-trade
Bown, C. P., and McCulloch, R. (2009). US–Japan and US–China trade conflict:
Export growth, reciprocity, and the international trading system. Journal of Asian
Economics, 20(6), 669-687.
Bown, C. P., and McCulloch, R. (2005, June 1). U.S. trade policy toward China:
Discrimination and its implications. Retrieved November 26, 2017, from
https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-trade-policy-toward-chinadiscrimination-and-its-implications/

61

Breuninger, K. and Tausche, K. (2018, March 22). Trump slaps China with tariffs on
up to $60 billion in imports: 'This is the first of many'. CNBC. Retrieved from
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/trump-moves-to-slap-china-with-50-billionin-tariffs-over-intellectual-property-theft.html
Brown, S. (2010, October 17). For our China trade emergency, dial Section
301. The New York Times. Retrieved October 10, 2017, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/opinion/18brown.html
Cage, M. (2018, March 29). How will China react to Trump’s tariffs? Here are 5
things you should know. The Washington Post. Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/29/how-willchina-react-to-trumps-tariffs-here-are-5-things-you-should
know/?utm_term=.a9c751cd2ce8
Capri, A. (2018, March 2). As Trump turns up heat on China over trade and
intellectual property, will it backfire?. Forbes. Retrieved from
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alexcapri/2018/03/02/as-trump-turns-up-heat-on-china-over-trade-andintellectual-property-will-it-backfire/&ref
Chen, A. (2003). The three big rounds of U.S.. unilateralism versus WTO
multilateralism during the last decade: a combined analysis of the great 1994
sovereignty debate, section 301 disputes (1998-2000), and section 201 disputes
(2002-Present). Temp. Int'l & Comp. LJ, 17, 409.

62

AmCham China. (2017). China business climate survey report. Retrieved from
https://www.amchamchina.org/uploads/media/default/0001/06/990dc2c671441d8
82586cc05ded6dde7e261fa0e.pdf
AmCham China. (2018). China business climate survey report. Retrieved from
http://www.bain.com/Images/BAIN%20REPORT_2018_China_Business_Climat
e_Survey_Report.pdf
China’s Ministry of Commerce. (2017). A Research Report on China-U.S. Economic
and Trade Relations. Retrieved from
http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/us/201705/20170526035246599.pdf
China Trapping U.S. at trade table with 100-day sweetener talks. (2017, July
5). BloombergPolitics. Retrieved from
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-05/china-trapping-u-s-attrade-table-with-100-day-sweetener-talks
Coffield, S. A. (1980). Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to
Foreign Government Trade Actions: When, Why, and How. NCJ Int'l L. & Com.
Reg., 6, 381.
Department of Commerce. (2017, May 11). JOINT RELEASE: Initial Results of the
100-Day Action Plan of the U.S. - China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.
Retrieved November 22, 2017, from https://www.commerce.gov/news/pressreleases/2017/05/joint-release-initial-results-100-day-action-plan-us-chinacomprehensive

63

Diamond, J. (2018, March 23). Trump hits China with tariffs, heightening concerns of
global trade war. CNN Politics. Retrieved from
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/22/politics/donald-trump-china-tariffs-tradewar/index.html
Dollar, D. (2017). United States-China two-way direct investment: Opportunities and
challenges. Journal of Asian Economics, 50, 14-26.
Dollar, D., and Hass, R. (2017, August 9). Trump could be on the brink of starting a
trade war with China. Brookings. Retrieved November 26, 2017, from
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/09/trump-could-beon-the-brink-of-starting-a-trade-war-with-china/
Duke University School of Law. (2017). GATT/WTO Research Guide. Retrieved
November 19, 2017, from https://law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/gatt/
Federal Register. (2017, October 10). China Technology Transfer Hearing Transcript.
Retrieved from
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/China%20Techn
ology%20Transfer%20Hearing%20Transcript.pdf
Fischer, N.A., Becker, S.E. and Hafeez, S.J. (2017, November 13). U.S. Employs
Rarely Used Tool to Probe China IP Practices. Lexology. Retrieved from
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ef4cd198-99ad-4985-af78bc04d0c614f6
Fisher, B. S., and Steinhardt III, R. G. (1982). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974:

64

Protection for U.S. exporters of goods, services, and capital. Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus., 14, 569.
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on January
22, 2018. (2018, January 22). Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1527756.shtml
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on August
14, 2017. (2017, August 14). Retrieved from
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1484636.shtml
Fukunaga, Y. (2008). Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of adjudicating minimum
standards agreements. Berkeley Tech. LJ, 23, 867.
IP Commission. (2017). The IP Commission Report. Retrieved from
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf
Gero, J., and Lannan, K. (1995). Trade and innovation: Unilateralism v.
multilateralism. Can.-USLJ, 21, 81.
Goodman, M. P., Remler, D., and Yu, Y. (2017, September 22). Parallel Perspectives
on the Global Economic Order. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Retrieved November 22, 2017, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/parallelperspectives-global-economic-order
Heatley, J. (2017, May 17). What's in the US-China 100 Day Action Plan? The
Diplomat. Retrieved November 25, 2017, from
https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/whats-in-the-us-china-100-day-action-plan/

65

Interviewee A. (2017). Personal interview.
Interviewee B. (2017). Personal interview.
Interviewee C. (2017). Personal interview.
Interviewee D. (2017). Personal interview.
Interviewee E. (2018). Personal interview.
Interviewee F. (2018). Personal interview.
Interviewee G. (2018). Personal interview.
Interviewee H. (2018). Personal interview.
Interviewee I. (2018). Personal interview.
Kennedy, S. (2017, October 10). China’s acts, policies, and practices related to
technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Retrieved November 27, 2017, from
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-acts-policies-and-practices-relatedtechnology-transfer-intellectual-property-and
Lawder, D. (2018, March 28). Trump's China tariffs may not begin until June: U.S.
officials. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina/trumps-china-tariffs-may-not-begin-until-june-u-s-officialsidUSKBN1H42Z7
Lexology. (2018, March 23). Trump administration takes action following Section

66

301 Investigation. Lexology. Retrieved from
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8fa2062f-16ee-463c-ae23fdaa484e1aa4
Lou, X. S. (2004). Challenging China's fixed exchange rate regime: An analysis of
U.S. options. Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 28, 455.
Miles, T. (2018, March 27). U.S. and China tussle at WTO over legality of Trump
tariffs. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tradechina-wto/u-s-and-china-tussle-at-wto-over-legality-of-trump-tariffsidUSKBN1H32J5
Monten, L. M. (2005). The inconsistency between Section 301 and TRIPS:
Counterproductive with respect to the future of international protection of
intellectual property rights. Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev., 9, 387.
Morrison, W. M. (2011). China-U.S. trade issues. Current Politics and Economics of
Northern and Western Asia, 20(3), 409.
Moyer, M. A. (1994). Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988: A formidable weapon in the war against economic espionage. Nw. J. Int'l L.
& Bus., 15, 178.
Nakamura, D., and Parker, A. (2017, November 9). In Beijing, Trump declines to hit
President Xi Jinping on trade: ‘I don’t blame China’. The Washington Post.
Retrieved November 28, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-

67

politics/wp/2017/11/08/in-beijing-trump-lavishes-praise-on-chinese-leader-toutsgreat-chemistry-between-them/?utm_term=.a9cd087def7d
NTE. (2017). 2017 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.
Retrieved November 27, 2017, from
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/NTE/2017%20NTE.pdf
Philip, A., and Mayeda, A. (2017, October 10). Trump is warned his intellectualproperty probe risks a trade war with China. BloombergPolitics. Retrieved
November 23, 2017, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-1010/trump-warned-intellectual-property-probe-risks-china-trade-war
Reuters. (2018, January 22). China says United States is real threat to global trade,
not itself. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-usatrade/china-says-united-states-is-real-threat-to-global-trade-not-itselfidUSKBN1FB102
Ellings, J.R. (2017). Testimony on behalf of the Commission on
the Theft of American Intellectual Property before the United States Trade
Representative.
Robertson, S. (2010). (AMM) USW files Section 301 trade petition against
China. Metal Bulletin Daily, (228), 231.
Segal. S. and Reinsch,W.A. (2018, March 23). Section 301, tariffs, and Chinese

68

trade and investment. CSIS. Retrieved from
https://www.csis.org/analysis/section-301-tariffs-and-chinese-trade-andinvestment
Stern, M. R., and Ries, J. (2000, May). U.S.-Japan trade policy and FDI issues.
University of Michigan. Retrieved from
http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/CGP/Oct2000Papers/Stern.pdf
Stewart, T. P. (2004). China’s compliance with World Trade Organization
obligations: A review of China’s 1st two years of membership. A report for the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington DC:
USCC.< http://www. uscc. gov/researchreports/2004/04annual_report. PDF>
accessed June, 30, 2004.
Sylvia, R. and Sylvia, K. (2012). Program Planning And Evaluation For The Public
Manager (Fourth Edition). Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
The Economist. (2005, April 25). Putting up the barricades. The Economist. Retrieved
October 12, 2017, from http://www.economist.com/node/3905158
The White House. (2017a,). Presidential Executive Order on Buy American
and Hire American. April 18. Retrieved November 21, 2017, from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/18/presidential-executiveorder-buy-american-and-hire-american
The White House. (2017b,). Presidential Memorandum for the United States Trade
Representative. August 14. Retrieved November 1, 2017, from

69

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/14/presidentialmemorandum-united-states-trade-representative
The White House. (2018). Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United
States Related to the Section 301 Investigation. Retrieved from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandumactions-united-states-related-section-301-investigation/
The WTO and GATT: A Principled History. (2016). Brookings. Retrieved November
22, 2017, from https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/selfenforcingtrade_chapter.pdf
Thomas, O., and Elliott, K. A. (1992). ‘Aggressive unilateralism’ and Section 301:
market opening or market closing. The World Economy, 15(6), 685-706.
Trade Act Of 1974. (2016, February 24). Retrieved from
https://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/93-618.pdf
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. (1984, October 30). Retrieved from
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg2948.pdf
U.S. Constitution. (2017). Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/constitution-transcript
U.S. Code. (2012). Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2015title19/pdf/USCODE-2015-title19-chap12-subchapI-part8-sec2242.pdf
USTR. (1988, August 23). Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.

70

Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-102/pdf/STATUTE102-Pg1107.pdf
USTR. (2010, October). United States launches section 301 investigation into China’s
policies affecting trade and investment in green technologies. Retrieved
November 24, 2017, from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2010/october/united-states-launches-section-301investigation-c
USTR. (2016, April). 2016 Special 301 Report. Retrieved November 27, 2017, from
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2016-Special-301-Report.pdf
USTR. (2017, August). USTR announces initiation of Section 301 investigation of
china. Retrieved December 2, 2017, from https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section
USTR. (2017). Home page. Retrieved November 26, 2017, from
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china
USTR. (2018, March). Following President Trump’s Section 301 decisions, USTR
launches new WTO challenge against China. Retrieved from
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2018/march/following-president-trump’s-section
USTR. (2018, March). President Trump announces strong actions to address China’s
unfair trade. Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/about- us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2018/march/president-trump- announces-strong

71

World Intellectual Property Organization. (n.d.). Home page. Retrieved from
http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/index.html
World Trade. (2018, March 27). U.S., China tussle over Section 301's compatibility
with WTO rules at DSB. World Trade Online. Retrieved from
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/us-china-tussle-over-section-301'scompatibility-wto-rules-dsb
World Trade Organization. (n.d.). Home page. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org
World Trade Organization. (n.d.). Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm
World trade Organization. (n.d.). Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes. Retrieved from
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm
Wu. W. (2018, March 20). China vows to end forced tech transfers in manufacturing
sector. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138087/chinavows-end-forced-tech-transfers-manufacturing
Xu, C. (2008). China - US intellectual property conflict and its enlightenment.
Retrieved October 12, 2017, from Institute of Law and Institute of International
Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
Yu, P. K. (2010). TRIPS enforcement and developing countries. Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.,
26, 727.

72

Zeng, K. (2002). Complementary trade structure and U.S.-China negotiations over
intellectual property rights. East Asia, 20(1), 54-80.
Zhang, Y. (1995). Agreements between China and the United States on intellectual
property rights. China Economic Information, 9. Retrieved October 13, 2017.

73

